TASK FORCE SMITH AFTER ACTION REPORT

I WAS THE ONLY CIVILIAN IN THIS CLASS, AND THE ARMY HAS NEVER SEEN AN AAR WRITTEN AND SUBMITTED FASTER

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

UNITED STATES ARMY ROTC BATTALION

LOYOLA UNIVERSITY

1144 WEST LOYOLA AVE

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60626

ATTCC-CCI-LUC 20 SEPT 2021

INFORMATION PAPER: PRINCIPLES OF JOINT OPERATIONS APPLIED TO TF SMITH AND THE 24TH DIVISION

According to Roy Flint, “Given the disadvantages, Task Force Smith did about as much as could be hoped for, and performed reasonably well.” While Flint does not hold the same apologist attitude for the 34th Regiment of the 24th Division as he does for the 21st, he recognizes that the majority of problems encountered during the first two weeks of fighting in Korea in 1950, stemmed from earlier, external problems. Therefore, the messiness of the ultimate success of the 24th Division must be attributed to the operational and strategic leaders of the Army as much as the leaders on the ground. Despite the ultimate success of defending the port at Pusan, the battles fought were more in contrast to the Principles of Joint Operations than in accord, and it was only through a series of delaying actions at extreme cost that the 24th was able to defend Pusan for two weeks while awaiting reinforcements. The successes and failures of the 24th Division are most visible in the Principles of Objective, Mass, Maneuver, Unity of Command, Simplicity, and Perseverance.

OBJECTIVE: The core objective of defending Pusan was clearly defined, but that is where the successful use of Objective ends. There was poor communication between organizational and strategic leaders and the leaders fighting in Korea, resulting in a lack of emphasis placed on holding land as far north as possible. As the 21st withdrew from Osan, and the 34th withdrew from Ch’onan, the everyday objectives had to change as they were clearly not achievable. The inability to hold a position created a culture of defeat and gave leaders the justification for early withdrawal. LTC Ayers of the 1st Battalion of the 34th Regiment ignored his orders to hold P’yongt’aek as long as possible and withdrew his battalion to Ch’onan when they could not establish an efficient base of fire. In addition to a losing attitude, there were simply not enough men to complete the everyday objectives. COL Meloy of the 19th Regiment was tasked with the impossible mission of defending 30 miles of river front with only two battalions. The North Koreans were able to cross the river in the gaps between his companies. The constant changing of Objective due to frequent withdrawals lowered morale and placed an emphasis more on escape than the actual fight.

MASS: From a broad, organizational standpoint, there were issues with Mass for the 24th Division, and Army in general, long before violence broke out in Korea. Following WWII, the Army had demobilized and down-sized as much as possible to appease the American people who were ready to embrace a mindset of peace. The Army was left scattered across the world in mostly small-scale, under-strength colonial occupation missions. This had been the 24th’s status in Kyushu, Japan in the summer of 1950. Only recently had the arrival of LTG Walker switched the focus of the Eighth Army from occupation to training. The problem of too few, inadequately trained troops carried into Korea. In TF Smith’s defense of the hill north of Osan, the first American engagement with North Korean forces, a delay had been caused by friendly fire from the Air Force, and LTC Smith’s troops had not successfully dug into their position. They concentrated fire to prevent a frontal assault, but did not have the wherewithal to prevent North Korean flanking maneuvers. When it became clear that a small American force was not enough to intimidate the North Koreans, they were left susceptible to the enemy and had to withdraw. As the 34th later proved unsuccessful at holding the Kum River line, Flint writes, “Good intentions and sound tactics were not enough to offset the lack of a third battalion. Once again, the under-strength American units were unable to handle the more numerous North Koreans.” The lack of troops made it impossible for the 24th to utilize the principle of Mass.

MANEUVER: Withdrawing maneuvers are seldom favorable, and the 24th executed a lot of them in the first two weeks in Korea. Flint writes, “Withdrawing under fire in daylight is a most difficult and dangerous maneuver.” The first maneuver was LTC Smith’s selection of the 300 foot hill north of Osan. This spot lacked cover, but had an excellent field of fire and offered a vantage point view of nearly eight miles to Suwon whence the North Koreans were expected. This was advantage enough when intelligence underestimated the strength of North Korean troops. Reluctant to give up this very first position of the war, LTC Smith waited arguably too long to call a withdrawal. He waited for his confidence in intimidating the enemy to wane, and then pulled back under fire with proportional casualties, returning to Ch’onan with just over half of his men. This maneuver set the tone for the rest of the 24th’s actions those first two weeks. No one seemed to learn from TF Smith’s withdrawal, and under-strength, over-confident units went out, were unsuccessful in disadvantaging the enemy, and withdrew farther south.

UNITY OF COMMAND: At the outset of the war, Unity of Command seemed to be one of the few advantages the 24thDivision possessed. COL Stephens, LTC Smith, and LTC Jensen were all well liked and contributed to a sense of cohesion within the regiment. Many of the officers and NCOs were veterans of WWII and thus experienced in combat. Unfortunately, there was a high turnover rate for commanders in those first two weeks in Korea. After the engagement near Osan, LTC Smith collapsed and had to be medevacked to Japan. A rare successful counterattack against the North Koreans in Choch’iwon left the promoted COL Jensen KIA. Even GEN Dean became separated after being wounded and was captured a month later. Particularly in the 34th, replacement leaders lacking training and experience weakened the entire regiment. Flint writes, “Company commanders, junior officers, and noncommissioned officers mirrored the uncertainty of their commanders and in general performed badly.” The inability to have consistent leaders proved to be problematic when it came to keeping the enlisted men focused on their objectives. It also made communication and collaboration with the ROK forces impossible. The two did not form a coalition army, but rather maneuvered and fought (and withdrew) as each saw fit. Confusion around command resulting from constantly changing leaders broke down the division-wide sense of unity and confused objectives.

SIMPLICITY: Confusing orders that seemed destined for failure from their issuing led to a loss of cohesion. After the 3dBattalion of the 34th Regiment withdrew from Ansong, GEN Dean ordered a delaying action. The 3d failed to find the enemy quickly and easily, and the battalion began to splinter apart, with some of the troops withdrawing back toward Ch’onan. S-3 Dunn encountered a withdrawing group of Soldiers and sent them back north. S-3 Dunn himself then succumbed to a North Korean ambush. Members of the 3d refused to pursue the ambush party, fearing it was too large for them to subdue. Planning missions around directly engaging with an elusive enemy proved complicated. This is another reason the Americans were often on the defensive, letting the North Koreans come to the fight on their own. The ambiguity involved with finding the enemy broke unit cohesion and morale.

PERSEVERANCE: The principle of which the 24th gave a most exemplary display was Perseverance. The mission to defend Pusan was a complete mess at the technical level, but the objective was not lost. The 24th fought practically alone in Korea for two weeks. It lost half of its men, many of its commanders, and lots of materiel. Yet, it cannot be overlooked that it successfully prevented the North Koreans from capturing the port at Pusan. At the individual level, Perseverance was shown by COL Perry in the artillery defense of the hill outside Osan. Wounded, COL Perry insisted on remaining in his position, fighting with his men. This show of Perseverance proved contagious and set an example to other officers and NCOs, in addition to inspiring confidence in his subordinates that he was committed to the objective. Even in the loss of leadership, troops persevered to the point of completing their mission, no matter how ugly the journey to get there proved.

Though almost everything went wrong in between, the 24th successfully defended Pusan. Hindsight suggests improvement in nearly every Principle of Joint Operations outlined by the Army, but many of the obstacles faced had been established long before July 1950. While TF Smith and the actions of the 24th in Korea offer more opportunities to learn from mistakes and recognize what not to do, it is an important showing of perseverance in military history and overcoming organizational and strategic error. It also contains lessons on the importance of military training in peacetime. Conflicts arise quickly and facing a prepared and spirited enemy with forces that are under-strength and under-trained can result in many unnecessary casualties.

MELINA TESTIN

Student

Rambler Battalion ROTC